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Peace treaties and trade between  
the Kingdom of Naples and Tripoli  




The purpose of this paper is to analyse the trade agreements that the King-
dom of Naples stipulated with the Regency of Tripoli during the eighteenth 
century, focusing on the specific contents of trade relations between the King-
dom and the Barbary State in the Mediterranean, at different historical times 
in Mezzogiorno (Southern Italy). The first treaty was signed in 1729, during 
Austrian rule in Naples; the second dates to 1741, during the Regency of Charles 
of Bourbon. The last trade treaty of the eighteenth century was stipulated in 
1785, under the government of Ferdinand IV. The study of those agreements 
has allowed some further insights into the relations between the Kingdom of 
Naples and the Regency of Tripoli in the Mediterranean of the eighteenth 
century, an important crossroads of trade, diplomatic relations and disputes 
between states. 
Keywords: peace treaties, piracy, Kingdom of Naples, Regency of Tripoli, 
trade treaty.
 * A first version of this paper was presented at the 19th Annual International 
Congress of the Mediterranean. Studies Association, University of Palermo (Italy), 
May 25th-28th, 2016.
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Tractats de pau i de comerç entre el Regne de Nàpols i Trípoli al segle xviii
Resum
L’article analitza els tractats comercials entre el Regne de Nàpols i la Regència 
de Trípoli al llarg del segle xviii. S’evidencien els continguts específics de les 
relacions econòmiques entre el Regne i la potència barbaresca en el mar Me-
diterrani en diferents moments de la història del sud d’Itàlia. El primer tractat 
va ser signat l’any 1729 durant el virregnat austríac, mentre que el segon és de 
1741, sota el govern de Carles de Borbó. L’últim tractat va ser estipulat el 1785, 
durant el regnat de Ferran IV. Mitjançant la lectura d’aquests documents, 
l’article mostra la vivacitat dels intercanvis comercials i de les relacions diplo-
màtiques al Mediterrani del segle xviii.
Paraules claus: tractats de pau, pirateria, Regne de Nàpols, Regència de Trí-
poli, tractat comercial.
Tratados de paz y comercio entre el Reino de Nápoles y Trípoli en el siglo xviii
Resumen
Este artículo analiza los tratados comerciales entre el Reino de Nápoles y la 
Regencia de Trípoli en el siglo xviii. Se subrayan los aspectos específicos de las 
relaciones económicas entre el Reino de Nápoles y la potencia berberisca en 
el Mediterráneo en momentos diferentes de la historia del sur de Italia. El 
primer tratado fue firmado durante el virreinato austriaco, en 1729, el segun-
do es de 1741 y tuvo lugar durante el reinado de Carlos de Borbón, y el último 
fue estipulado en 1785 por Fernando IV. Con la lectura de estas fuentes, el 
artículo muestra la vivacidad de los intercambios comerciales y de las relacio-
nes diplomáticas en el Mediterráneo del siglo xviii. 
Palabras llaves: tratados de paz, piratería, Reino de Nápoles, Regencia de 
Trípoli, tratado comercial.
Introduction 
The non-development of relations between Naples and the Ottoman 
Empire between 1500 and 1600 stemmed from the endemic state of 
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war between the two countries. From the early 1500s, after the con-
quest of the Neapolitan viceroyalty by Ferdinand the Catholic (1503), 
there had been continuous assaults of the Turkish fleet on the southern 
coasts, in constant conflict with Spain for possession of the territory. 
To these were added the corsairs from the Barbary States, primarily 
those of Algiers1 and Tunis, formed in northern Africa under the pro-
tection of the Ottoman Empire.2 The Turks could set up an imposing 
fleet not only in the shipyards of Constantinople but also in those of 
the countries subject to their dominion, primarily Greece; and to these 
were to be added the fleets set up by the Barbarian corsairs. All began 
with the feats of the Barbarossa brothers, Oruç and Hair el-Din, Greek 
sailors of the island of Lesbos, who, at the beginning of the sixteenth 
century, reached the coasts of North Africa to give themselves to the 
corsa (piracy), just in the period when the Sultan Bayezid II launched a 
great offensive in the east, incorporating Syria and Egypt into the Ot-
toman Empire.3 Spain, instead, had a different naval organization and 
a less numerous fleet:4 also there were to be added the fleets of the 
subject Neapolitan5 and Sicilian kingdoms.6 Valuable help came from 
 1. John B. Wolf, The Barbary Coast: Algeria under the Turks, Norton, New 
York, 1979.
 2. Salvatore Bono, Corsari nel Mediterraneo. Cristiani e musulmani fra guerra, 
schiavitù, commercio, Mondadori, Milano, 1997 and Un altro Mediterraneo. Una sto-
ria comune fra scontri e integrazione, Salerno, ed., Rome, 2008.
 3. Mirella Mafrici, Carlo V e i Turchi nel Mediterraneo. L’ultima spedizione di 
Khair-el-din Barbarossa (1544-44), in F. Cantù, M. A. Visceglia, eds., L’Italia di Carlo 
V. Guerra, religione e politica nel primo Cinquecento, Viella, Rome, 2003, pp. 639-657. 
 4. Irving I. A. Thompson, Guerra y decadencia. Govierno y administraciòn en la 
Espana de los Austrias, 1560-1620, 1st ed. London, 1976. 
 5. Maria Sirago, «La flotta napoletana nel viceregno spagnolo (1507-1598)», 
Frontiera d’Europa, n. 1 (1999), pp. 111-172. 
 6. Valentina Favarò, «La escuadra de galeras del regno di Sicilia. Costruzione, 
armamento, amministrazione (xvi secolo)», in R. Cancila, ed., Mediterraneo in armi 
(secc. xv-xviii), Associazione Mediterranea, Palermo, 2007, pp. 397-428 (Mediterra-
nea, Ricerche Storiche. Quaderni, 4).
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the Knights of Malta,7 who exercised the corsa,8 and from those of the 
«particolari», formed at the time of Charles V (Genovese, Toscana, Pa-
pal, Savoyard).9 Among these main protagonists of the Mediterranean 
scenario there was also Venice, with its mighty fleet, often in aid of 
Spain during particular moments of crisis such as the Battle of Lepanto 
(1571), which, however, saw the decrease of its power during the 1600s 
because of the Ottoman Empire, in its continuous attempt to establish 
control of the Mediterranean.10 Added to all this was the problem of 
«flag camouflage», analyzed by Maria Stella Rollandi for the Genoese 
Navy; that is, raising a different banner to hide the true nationality of 
the ship and carry out the corsa.11 This situation remained unchanged 
throughout the period of the Spanish domination in Southern Italy 
(1503-1707), to the point that to be able to trade, merchant ships had to 
be protected by war ships. In addition, the same sailors, often captured 
and sold as slaves, in the Neapolitan capital and the Gulf had created 
religious «guilds» called «Monti dei Padroni di Barche e Marinai» (Funds 
of Ship Captains and Sailors), a kind of insurance, which were to pro-
vide for the various needs of themselves and their families, disabilities, 
deaths, dowry to the daughters and, above all, ransom from slavery.12 
During the Austrian rule (1707-1734) the problem remained unchanged 
 7. Ettore Rossi, Storia della marina dell’Ordine di San Giovanni di Gerusalemme 
di Rodi e di Malta, Società Editrice d’arte illustrata, Rome-Milan, 1926. 
 8. Peter Earle, Corsairs of Malta and Barbery, Sidgwich and Jackson, London, 
1970.
 9. Bruno Anatra, Le armi e il mare, in G. Galasso, A. Musi, eds., Carlo V, Na-
poli e il Mediterraneo, Atti del convegno internazionale, published in Archivio storico 
per le province napoletare, 41 (2001), pp. 124-125.
 10. Giovanni Muto, Percezione del territorio e strategia del controllo nel Medite-
rraneo spagnolo (secoli xvi- xvii), in R. Villari, ed., Controllo degli stretti e insediamen-
ti militari nel Mediterraneo, Laterza, Bari, 2002, pp. 169-190.
 11. Maria Stella Rollandi, «Mimetismo di bandiera nel Mediterraneo nel se-
condo Settecento. Il caso del Giorgio inglese», Società e storia, 130 (2010), pp. 721-742. 
 12. Giuseppe Di Taranto, I Monti dei padroni di imbarcazioni e dei marinai, in 
A. Guenzi, P. Massa, A. Moioli, eds., Corporazioni e gruppi professionali nell’Italia 
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to the point that precise orders were given for the construction of ves-
sels to be placed to defend the merchant ships carrying the foodstuffs 
for the annonae supply of Abruzzi and Puglie Capital.13 For this reason 
the emperor Charles VI had decided to begin negotiations with the 
Sublime Porte and the Barbary States, to limit the corsa and create more 
favorable conditions for trade. On July 21st, 1718, to end the Second 
War of Morea,14 the Austrian Emperor, Charles VI, signed a peace trea-
ty with the Ottoman Empire in Passarowitz. It granted free trade be-
tween the countries of the two contracting kings, and freedom of navi-
gation for their ships in the Black Sea, «sicchè caricate le mercanzie si 
potessero trasportare in Costantinopoli, nella Crimea, in Trebisonda, in 
Sinope e in altri empori di quel mare senza impedimento di sorta alcu-
na» (so that the loaded merchandise could be transported in Constan-
tinople, Crimea, Trabzon, Sinope, and other trading points on that sea 
without impediment whatsoever), stating in chapter XIII a clause of 
vital importance, namely that «merchants of both nations could trade 
freely».15 The agreement stipulated that the maximum rate of duties on 
export and import should be fixed at 3%.16 
moderna, Atti del Convegno, Rome 26-27 September 1997, F. Angeli, Milan, 1998, 
pp. 589- 612.
 13. Sirago, «La ricostruzione della flotta napoletana e il suo apporto alla difesa 
dei mari nel viceregno austriaco (1707-1734)», Archivio Storico per le Province Napole-
tane (2016), pp. 71-98.
 14. Kenneth M. Setton, Venice, Austria, and the Turks in the Seventeenth Century, 
The American Philosophical Society, Philadelphia, 1991, pp. 426 ss.
 15. Sirago, «La ricostruzione della flotta napoletana»; Istrumento di pace Stabili-
ta e Firmata in Passarowitz nel Regno di Servia a di 22 del Mese di Luglio 1718 tra 
Carlo VI e il Sultano Achmedhan, Sebastiano Porsile Stampatore della Reg. Generale, 
Naples, 1718.
 16. Giuseppe F. De Tiberiis, «Le Riflessioni sopra il commercio di Federico Valig-
nani. Alle origini del pensiero riformatore nel regno di Napoli», Frontiera d’Europa, 
VII, n. 1-2 (2001), I, p. 182 and II, p. 230.
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1. Austrian era (1707-1734) 
A few days after the signing of peace, the emperor Charles VI wanted 
to define even better the relations with the Sublime Porte, stipulating 
on July 27th, 1718 a very significant Treaty of Trade, recalls Antonio di 
Vittorio, «not only in the new course of relations between the Empire 
— and, therefore, also the Kingdom of Naples — and Sublime Porte 
but for the start of an expansion of the Habsburg commercial area», al-
though it «stipulated in an imperial perspective, was the cause of friction 
and trade conflicts between the Kingdom of Naples — one of the most 
peripheral provinces of the Empire — and the Sublime Porte itself».17 
In fact, at the end of the long conflict over the Spanish succession the 
emperor had succeeded in further expanding his maritime possessions 
by obtaining possession of Sicily in 1720 with the Treaty of The Hague.18 
It was therefore necessary to reorganize the entire port system of the 
island, starting with the Messina port, which had always been an im-
portant place of exchange in the Mediterranean.19 At the same time, in 
line with the mercantile policy pursued by the Habsburg government, 
the Adriatic port system was also to be reorganized:20 so on 18th March, 
1719, the status of Duty Free Port was granted to Trieste and Fiume, a 
 17. Antonio Di Vittorio, Il Coinvolgimento del Regno di Napoli, provincia aus-
triaca (1707-1734), nel trattato commerciale del 1718 tra Impero asburgico e Porta ottoma-
na, in A. Giuffrida, F. D’Avenia, D. Palermo, eds., Studi storici dedicati a Orazio 
Cancila, Associazione Mediterranea, Palermo, 2011, III, p. 928.
 18. Francesca F. Gallo, «La Sicilia di Carlo VI: riforma amministrativa e ricerca 
del consenso (1719-1734)», Cheiron, 21 (1994), pp. 187-226.
 19. Salvatore Bottari, The port of Messina (1591-1783), in M. D’Angelo, G. Har-
laftis, C. Vassallo, eds., Making waves in Mediterranean. Sulle onde del Mediterraneo, 
Proceedings of the 2nd MMHN Conference Messina and Taormina, 4th-7th May 
2006, Istituto di Studi Storici «Gaetano Salvemini», Messina, 2010, pp. 626- 650: 
643.
 20. Daniele Andreozzi, «La gloria di un dilatato commercio. L’intrico delle 
politiche e lo sviluppo di Trieste nell’Adriatico centro settentrionale (1700 - 1730)», 
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decree also confirmed for Messina in 1728.21 A few months later, on 
27th May, 1719, the «Compagnia Caesarea Orientale» was established, 
on the model of the British and Dutch, based in Vienna and Trieste, 
which was to become an instrument for the commercial development 
of the Empire.22 Within this context the southern viceroyalty benefit-
ted from the new course of the Habsburg politics, so that here also 
there were diplomatic negotiations, in the wake of those stipulated 
with the Sublime Porte. Thus, economic relations between the Otto-
mans and the Neapolitans were regulated by trade treaties, considered 
as the main instruments to encourage trade exchange.23 The Kingdom 
of Naples could expand its commerce in the Levant only through trea-
ties of amity and trade, «non-aggression pacts», with the Barbary States; 
therefore, it was thanks to this cooperation that trade relations between 
European states and the Ottoman Empire intensified. The need for 
more lucrative trade routes in the Mediterranean, and the necessity of 
preventing the increasingly frequent attacks by the Barbary pirates, led 
the Kingdom of Naples to compel Barbary rulers to sign non-aggres-
sion pacts. A lasting peace through the nations would have protected 
them from the menacing presence of the pirates and granted them free 
trade and navigation, as well as the safety of their ships and the securi-
Mélanges de l’École française de Rome-Italie et Méditerranée moderne set contemporaines, 
127-1 (2015), pp. 1-18 [on-line journal available at https://mefrim.revues.org/2015].
 21. Maria Sirago, «Il ‘sistema’ portuale italiano in età moderna», in A. Guimerà, 
D. Romero, eds., Puertos y sistemas portuarios (siglos xvi -xx), Actas del Coloquio In-
ternacional El Sistema Portuario Español, Ministerio de Fomento, Madrid, 1996, pp. 
53-76 e 64-65.
 22. Di Vittorio, Gli austriaci e il Regno di Napoli: 1707-1734: ideologia e politica 
di sviluppo, 2 vol., Giannini, Naples, 1973, p. 36.
 23. De Tiberiis, «Le Riflessioni sopra il commercio di Federico Valignani», p. 182; 
Sirago, Le città e il mare. Economia, politica portuale, identità culturale dei centri cos-
tieri del Mezzogiorno moderno, ESI, Napoli, 2004, p. 32; M. Mafrici, C. Vassallo, eds., 
Sguardi mediterranei tra Italia e Levante (xvii-xix secolo), Malta University Press, Mal-
ta, 2012; L. Mascilli Migliorini, M. Mafrici, eds., Mediterraneo e Mar Nero. Due mari 
tra età moderna e contemporanea, ESI, Naples, 2012.
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ty of their crews when entering ports in both countries, thus respecting 
the principle of reciprocity. 
During the conquest for the Mediterranean,24 declarations of war alter-
nated with peace treaties, while sea routes were threatened by corsairs and 
pirates,25 whose power had gradually increased, concentrating their raids 
on coastal populations and merchant vessels from the southern kingdom. 
Pacts often lasted only a short time, because of frequent violations of the 
treaty clauses even before the ratification of the treaty itself.26 Actually, 
the temporary nature of peace treaties signed by Muslim regents can be 
explained by their need to raid and, consequently, to alternate periods of 
peace with periods of war against the other states in order to make mon-
ey from stolen goods and ransoms paid for captured slaves,27 the most 
profitable merce (goods) for both Christians and Muslims.28 
Since then, the Treaty of Commerce with the Ottoman Empire (of 
July 27th, 1718) probably had been a model for trade negotiations with 
the Barbary States.29 
Treaties were often infringed by Barbary rulers because fare bottino 
(plundering) Neapolitan merchant vessels had become a modus viven-
di, above all starting from the first decade of the century, with the Si-
 24. Fernand Braudel, Civiltà e imperi nel Mediterraneo nell’età di Filippo II, 
Einaudi, Torino, 1986.
 25. Salvatore Bono, «Malta e Venezia fra corsari e schiavi (secc. xvi-xviii)», Me-
diterranea Ricerche storiche, III, n. 7 (2006), pp. 213-222.
 26. Antonio Di Vittorio, Il commercio tra Levante Ottomano e Napoli nel secolo 
xviii, Giannini, Naples, 1979.
 27. Salvatore Bono, «Storiografia e fonti occidentali sulla Libia (1510-1911)», Qua-
derni dell’Istituto Italiano di Cultura di Tripoli nel Settecento, n. s., Rome, 1982.
 28. Salvatore Bono, Schiavi. Una storia mediterranea (xvi-xix secolo), Il Mulino, 
Bologna, 2016.
 29. Michelangelo Schipa, Il Regno di Napoli al tempo di Carlo Borbone, Società 
editrice Dante Alighieri, Roma, 1923; F. Canale Cama, D. Casanova, R. M. Delli 
Quadri, L. Mascilli Migliorini, eds., Storia del Mediterraneo moderno e contemporaneo, 
Guida, Naples, 2009, p. 193.
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gnorìa dei Quaramânlî (Karamanli dynasty) governing Tripoli, when 
Barbary pirates gained control of the economic power, taking advan-
tage of the weak Neapolitan fleet.30 
Nevertheless, treaties were not always economically profitable. In 
this regard, Bianchini wrote: 
L’unico trattato che apportò qualche vantaggio fu quello del 1725 (...), 
inoltre due convenzioni del 1726 fatte con gli Stati d’Algeri e Tripoli che 
fermarono di potere i nostri concittadini colà liberamente trafficare; ma 
poiché inutile era venire a nudi patti con quei pirati, così niun bene a noi 
ne derivò, e al contrario le marine del nostro reame seguitarono ad essere 
esposte alle loro incursioni.31 
The study of the pragmatics (laws) of the kingdom helped us to 
deduce the specific content of the treaties of perpetual peace, amity, 
trade and navigation signed in the eighteenth century between the 
Kingdom of Naples and the Barbary States, as well as the economic 
situation of the geographical areas involved. First measures were taken 
by the Austrians in 1729 in order to guarantee to Neapolitan ships free 
 30. Francesco Corò, «Una relazione veneta su Tripoli nel Settecento», Rivista 
delle colonie italiane, IV (1930), pp. 1092-1102; Corò, «Una relazione veneziana 
dell’anno 1784 sulle Reggenze di Tunisi, Algeri e Tripoli», Tripolitania, I, n. 11 (1931), 
pp. 9-17; Corò, «Il Regno di Tripoli in una descrizione del 1768», Tripolitania, III, n. 
9-13 (1933); Ferdinando Buonocore, «Consoli o procuratori di Tripoli e di Tunisi 
nelle Due Sicilie (e cenni ad altri consoli o agenti dei paesi musulmani nell’epoca 
precoloniale», Africa, XXXI, n. 2 (1976), pp. 257-276; Teobaldo Filesi, Un secolo di 
rapporti tra Napoli e Tripoli, 1734-1835, Giannini, Naples, 1983; Francesco Barbaga-
llo, «Discussioni e progetti sul commercio tra Napoli e Costantinopoli nel ‘700», 
Rivista storica italiana, 2 (1971), pp. 264-296.
 31. «The only advantageous treaty was signed in 1725 [...], in addition to two 
conventions stipulated in 1726 with the States of Algiers and Tripoli confirming free 
trade and navigation for our citizens; however, coming to terms with the pirates was 
completely useless to us, because our Royal navies could not escape further pirate 
attacks.» Ludovico Bianchini, Storia delle finanze del Regno delle Due Sicilie, Luigi 
De Rosa, ed., Naples, ESI, 1971, p. 340.
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navigation of the Mediterranean.32 The contracting parties, following 
the example of a previous treaty signed in 1726 with the Regency of Tu-
nis and through the mediation of the Ottoman Porte,33 concluded an 
agreement consisting of thirteen articles about reciprocal freedom of 
navigation both for vessels and crews. 
The first article stated: 
Per l’avvenire tra le navi e i sudditi dei rispettivi Stati tanto per terra come 
per mare sieno tolte e proibite tutte le inimicizie e offese; di modo che dal 
giorno di questa sottoscrizione sia data piena soddisfazione, ed intera res-
tituzione dé danni che fossero stati fatti dall’una e l’altra parte onde le 
navi e i sudditi che da questo tempo in poi fossero presi e fatti schiavi 
sieno restituiti e poste in libertà con tutte le cose e tutto ciò che appar-
tiene a quelle [...].34
Moreover, Tripolitan corsair ships were prohibited from hindering 
the navigation of allied ships with flags and passports issued by the 
competent authority; it was also established that both parties should 
help each other in case of need, and that Tripolitan ships were allowed 
to visit merchant vessels to control patents and passports only with the 
prior consent of the captain of the ship.35 
The king had the right to appoint an imperial consul, or plenipo-
tentiary, and send him to the main Levantine ports of call to issue 
passports and patents to his subjects. Consuls acted as judges for set-
 32. Nuova Collezione delle Prammatiche del Regno di Napoli, V. Foedus Caesa-
rerum et Tripolitum, Napoli, Stamperia Simoniana, 1804, pp. 154-162.
 33. Mirella Mafrici, «Diplomazia e commerci tra il Regno di Napoli e la Subli-
me Porta: Guglielmo Maurizio Ludolf (1747-1789)», in M. Mafrici, ed., Rapporti di-
plomatici e scambi commerciali nel Mediterraneo Moderno, Rubbettino, Soveria Man-
nelli, 2005, pp. 151-172.
 34. «Hostilities between the navies and the populations of the contracting States 
shall be forbidden by land and sea, so that, from now on, the damage done to date 
can be repaired, the slaves set free and the stolen goods given back to their owners)», 
in Nuova Collezione delle Prammatiche del Regno di Napoli, V, pp. 154-162. 
 35. Ibidem.
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tling disputes between subjects, and they were free to return to their 
native country within three months of the breakdown of the treaty of 
amity. Bilateral negotiations brought about the end of hostilities, com-
pulsory mutual aid, and prohibition on holding crewmen in slavery. 
2. Under the first Bourbon kings (1734-1806)
From 1734, when it gained its independence under the rule of Charles 
of Bourbon, the Kingdom of Naples became involved in a wider net-
work of trade flows, following the mercantile plans proposed by the 
king’s minister.36 In 1740, the Ottoman Porte and the Kingdom of Na-
ples signed a twenty-year agreement. Thanks to the improvement of 
the Neapolitan merchant navy, diplomatic and trade relations between 
the two states started in a peaceful atmosphere, thus creating favorable 
conditions for trade exchange.37 The agreement was also the basis for 
further negotiations, which led to a treaty signed by the Kingdom of 
Naples and Tripoli in 1741.38 Tripoli, as a centre of commercial activities, 
was not as important as Constantinople, which was considered one of 
the chief trading places of the Empire, both for its population density, 
and for being a junction of the trade surplus of the other provinces.39 
However, expecting some benefits from trade, the Kingdom of Naples 
stipulated another treaty with the Regency of Tripoli through Giacinto 
Voschi, minister plenipotentiary of King Charles, acting as an interme-
diary. In fact, unofficial negotiations had begun a few years before the 
treaty was signed. A Jewish trader, Giuseppe Zevi, had been sent to 
Tripoli in order to promote friendly relations between the two coun-
 36. Maria Sirago, Le città e il mare, pp. 33 ss.
 37. Massimiliano Pezzi, Aspettando la pace. Il Levante ottomano nei documenti 
diplomatici napoletani (1806-1812), Studio Zeta, Rossano Scalo, 1992. 
 38. Archivio di Stato di Napoli (ASN), Affari Esteri, Costantinopoli, n. 187, in Di 
Vittorio, Il commercio tra Levante Ottomano e Napoli nel secolo xviii, p. 48. 
 39. Ibidem, p. 114.
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tries: it was his task to ingratiate himself with the Bey of Tripoli in an 
informal manner, by granting him privileges and giving him wheat as 
a gift. Indeed, Zevi, with the help of another Jewish trader acting as a 
mediator, Salomone Kalfon, a confidant of the Bey, was just testing the 
waters for the treaty that the Bey and Giacinto Voschi were going to 
sign.40 Zevi reported that Tripoli was not really a strong trading power 
because of the limited resources of its population, and that the Bey was 
more interested in private trade relations with his subjects than in slave 
redemption. Zevi also gave an accurate account of the trade in goods 
between the Regency of Tripoli in Barbary and the Kingdom of Na-
ples, mainly consisting of food and local manufactured goods such as 
«vini, formaggi ordinari, sardine salate, panni ossia drapperia di lana, 
panni di seta, cioè damaschi, velluti, taffettà (... che) paga in Tripoli di 
dogana cinque per cento, e due per cento di consolato».41 
Finally, some of the goods usually sent to Tripoli «si manda[va]no in 
Tripoli», like «panni ordinari del Regno di 14 o 15 carlini la canna, rossi, 
turchini, verdi, gialli e altri colori, vino, castagne, mele, ed altri frutti, 
carta grossa, zagarelle di seta e altre minute seterie, zulfaro ed alcuni altri 
generi, ma in poca quantità, atteso che il paese è piccolo».42 All goods 
were stored in the Neapolitan harbour, in a building called «Immaco-
latella Vecchia», or «Deputazione della Salute» (Deputation of Health), 
 40. ASN, Affari Esteri, f. 4410, in Filesi, «Un interessante capitolo delle relazioni 
tra Napoli e Tripoli: 1739-1747», p. 232. 
 41. «Wine, cheese, salted sardines, woolen drapery, silk cloths like damask, vel-
vet and taffetta, for which a five percent duty had to be paid in Tripoli, in addition to 
two percent due to the Consulate.» ASN, Affari Esteri, f. 4410, in Filesi, «Un interes-
sante capitolo delle relazioni tra Napoli e Tripoli: 1739-1747», p. 232.
 42. «Plain coloured fabrics made in the Kingdom and sold at 14 or 15 carlinos per 
perch — mainly red, turquoise, green, yellow — wine, chestnuts, apples, and other 
fruits, cartridge paper, silk ribbons and some other small articles made of silk, sul-
phur and other goods, were sent in small quantities because it was a small country.» 
ASN, Affari Esteri, f. 4410. 
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built by Antonio Vaccaro by order of Charles of Bourbon (about 1740),43 
whereas ships were usually detained in «quarantine» at the island of 
Nisida, near Naples.44 The word comes from the seventeenth-century 
Venetian dialectal Italian quarantena, so called because the length of the 
quarantine was typically forty days: during the epidemic of bubonic 
plague, the Black Death, it referred to the period of isolation or deten-
tion imposed upon ships when suspected of carrying a contagious dis-
ease, before passengers and crew were allowed to board.45 Quarantine 
can be applied to humans, but also to animals of various kinds, and 
both as part of border control, also within a country.46 
As for the goods coming from Tripoli, Zevi mentioned, «si cava[no] 
di Tripoli lane, rame, penne per cappelli o altro, grani, oglio, cuoi per 
scarpe, cera, dattali, zafferano, barracani di lana per marinai» (wool, 
copper, feathers for hats or anything else, grains, oil, leather for shoes, wax, 
dates, saffron and woolen barracans for seamen).47
The agreement signed in Tripoli on June 3rd, 1741, by Charles of 
Bourbon and Hakmet Quaramânlî, the Bey Bassà, confirming the invi-
olable principle of peaceful relations between the two countries, con-
 43. Maria Raffaela Pessolano, Il porto di Napoli nei secc. xvi-xviii, in G. Simon-
cini, ed., Sopra i porti di mare, II, Il Regno di Napoli, Olschki, Florence, 1993, pp. 
67-115.
 44. Giuseppe De Rinaldi, Napoli, Lazzaretto di Nisida, in N. E. Vanzan Mar-
chini, ed., Rotte mediterranee e baluardi di sanità, Venezia e i lazzaretti mediterranei, 
Skira ed., Geneva- Milan, 2004, pp. 268-271.
 45. Raffaella Salvemini, A tutela della salute e del commercio nel Mediterraneo: la 
sanità marittima nel Mezzogiorno pre-unitario, in R. Salvemini, ed., Istituzioni e tras-
porti marittimi nel Mediterraneo tra età antica e crescita moderna, Consiglio Nazionale 
delle Ricerche, Istituto di Studi sulle Società del Mediterraneo, Naples, 2009, pp. 
259-296. 
 46. Klaus Bergoltd, La fobia del contagio e le teorie mediche sul contagio, in Van-
zan Marchini, Rotte mediterranee, pp. 149-157.
 47. ASN, Affari Esteri, f. 4410, in Filesi, «Un interessante capitolo delle relazioni 
tra Napoli e Tripoli: 1739-1747», p. 232. 
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sisted of seventeen articles.48 Article III of the treaty dealt with prohib-
ited goods like ammunition and weapons, «senza l’espresso consenso 
delle due Potenze contrattanti non potrà farsi commercio» (whose trade 
was not allowed without the consent of the two contracting powers); it was 
also prohibited to trade in those goods, whether abundant or scarce, that 
«convenisse ad una delle Parti contrattanti di sospendere l’estrazione o 
l’immissione, dalla quale sospensione l’altra non potrà offendersi qualora 
sarà generale, e comune a tutte le altre Potenze amiche» (one of the con-
tracting parts judged most convenient to stop mining or placing on the mar-
ket, and for which the other contracting part would not be offended if the 
measure taken involved other allied powers). It was also established that 
both the contracting countries had equal rights in the payment of du-
ties, anchorage dues and stabling, fixed at 3%. Some other clauses pro-
vided for the procedure concerning the appointment and duties of con-
suls and vice consuls, as well as rules relating to shipwrecks and slave 
redemption: they also made certain guarantees to warships and mer-
chant vessels, such as mutual freedom of navigation and anchorage at 
each other’s ports, in addition to the payment of the imposed duties on 
goods. It was a detailed set of regulations for the merchant navy, as Di 
Vittorio wrote.49 Indeed, article VIII also included the rules that war-
ships belonging to the two powers had to obey when they met at sea 
(incrocio), or when their flags should be displayed. If warships met mer-
chant vessels, two seamen from the first ship were allowed to board the 
vessel to check the validity of the patents:
E riconosciuto che sarà conforme all’esemplare (...) lo lascerà continuare 
il suo viaggio senza impedimento alcuno aiutandolo anche, se ne sarà 
richiesto. Essendo però trovata la patente dissimile od invalida, ciò non 
sarà una ragione per depredarlo, né tampoco per molestarlo ma sola-
mente sarà la pena, a cui dovrà soccombere, regolata dalli rispettivi Gov-
 48. Nuova Collezione delle Prammatiche, V. Foedus Regium et Tripolitum, pp. 338-
346. 
 49. Di Vittorio, Il commercio tra Levante Ottomano e Napoli, pp. 49ss.
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erni né di cui Stati sarà condotto, d’accordo però con il Console ed 
Agente dell’altra Potenza, che vi risiederà.50 
Merchant vessels sailed from Sicilian ports to Tripoli carrying «fru-
mento, olio, sete, legumi, manne, formaggi, cascavalli, pistacchi, som-
macco, amandole, Sali, tonnine, vino, salnitro, pannine, acquavite, ce-
nere di soda, sovari, tartaro, uva passata, nocciole, coralli» (wheat, oil, 
silk, legumes, manna, cheese, caciocavallo, pistachios, sumac, almonds, salt, 
bonito, wine, saltpetre, wollen fabrics, aqua vitae, soda ash, cork, tartar, 
raisins, chestnuts, corals), whereas imported goods from Tripoli were «fru-
mento, olio, cera, cottone, coirami, legumi, riso, manteca, formaggi, 
lana, lino, caffè, pelli di camello, tabacchi, cuscusu e barracani» (wheat, 
oil, wax, cotton, leather, legumes, rice, butter, cheese, wool, linen, coffee, 
camel leather, tobaccos, couscous and barracans)51. The main port of the is-
land, indeed, its most important maritime trading place, was Messina;52 
but also important were, Palermo, Siracusa and Trapani, which repre-
sented, along with the Port of Messina, the four Deputazioni di Sanità 
 50. «And once it is verified that they are conforming to the original (...), the vessel 
can continue traveling unhindered or be helped if required. If a patent is not valid or 
not in compliance with the laws, the vessel will not be plundered or attacked, but it 
will have to pay a penalty established by the governmental authorities of the State 
where it will be conducted, in accordance with the residing consul and the consular 
agent of the country the vessel comes from», in Nuova Collezione delle Prammatiche 
del Regno di Napoli, V, pp. 154-162. 
 51. Vincenzo Epifanio, «Sulle relazioni politiche commerciali tra la Sicilia e la 
Tripolitania nella prima metà del secolo xviii», Archivio Storico Siciliano, n.s., xxxvi 
(1912), pp. 439-440; Filesi, Un interessante capitolo delle relazioni tra Napoli e Tripoli, 
p. 231, n. 37.
 52. Michela D’Angelo, «The Emporium of Trade of the Two Seas. The Re-
launching of the Port of Messina, 1784-1815», in M. D’Angelo, G. Harlaftis, C. Vas-
sallo, eds., Making waves in the Mediterranean. Sulle onde del Mediterraneo, pp. 651-
667, and «Navigando tra due Stretti (1800-06). Navi, merci e mercanti tra Messina e 
i Dardanelli», in M. Mafrici, C. Vassallo, eds., Sguardi mediterranei tra Italia e Levan-
te (xvii-xix secolo), pp. 83-99. 
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(quarantine stations) concerned with foreign trade.53 In Sicily, wheat 
and oil were so abundant that the island made a great profit from 
trade.54 Besides, importing of these goods from Tripoli was abolished, 
thus pursuing a double purpose: to preserve the agriculture on the is-
land, and to economize on duties. Furthermore, trade with the King-
dom of Naples increased thanks to food requests from the Regency in 
Tripoli, where provisions were carried mainly as gifts expressing friend-
ship and respect for the agreement signed by the two countries. As part 
of the intricate European historical background during the war of the 
Austrian Succession, the 1740s also witnessed remarkable events like 
Muslim fickleness, unjustified raids by Neapolitan corsairs, widespread 
unrest among Tripolitan subjects who could not conduct «corsa al 
Mediterraneo» (guerre de course in the Mediterranean) and, finally, the 
unexpected suicide of Hakmet Quaramânlî in 1745. These circumstances 
culminated in a declaration of war by Tripoli against Naples, and the 
ultimate breakdown and severing of the diplomatic relations and trade 
flows between the two countries.55
Under King Ferdinand, merchant shipbuilding increased very much 
in the shipyards of Piano and Meta (Sorrentine peninsula). Therefore, in 
consideration of the benefits from a previous trade agreement stipulat-
ed between Tripoli and Charles III, King Ferdinand decided to renew 
it on September 10th, 1784.56 He signed another agreement consisting 
of thirty-nine articles, which was ratified with Ahlì Quaramânlî on 
August 28th, 1785. It stated that warships or corsair ships meeting a 
 53. G. Simoncini, ed., Sopra i porti di mare, III. Sicilia e Malta, Olschki, Floren-
ce, 1997.
 54. Salvatore Bottari, «Trade and Politics between Naples, Sicily and The Otto-
man Empire during the Kingdom of Charles of Bourbon (1734-1759)», in H. Ersin 
Avci, T. Tarjh Kurum, eds., Türk Den¡zc¡lik Tar¡h¡ B¡ld¡r¡ler, Proceedings of the Interna-
tional Symposium of Piri Reis and Turkish Maritime History, Turk Tarik Kurum, Anka-
ra, 2014, pp. 149-155 and 269-271.
 55. Filesi, Un interessante capitolo delle relazioni tra Napoli e Tripoli, pp. 250-251.
 56. Nuova Collezione delle Prammatiche, V. Foedus Regium et Tripolitum, pp. 461-478. 
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Neapolitan merchant vessel at sea would not attack each other, in re-
spect of the principle of freedom of navigation, provided that proper 
documentation — such as passports issued by the Bey Bassà and certi-
fication issued by the Spanish consul — could be inspected upon re-
quest. If not, they would have been considered pirate ships. They were 
not allowed to conduct raids against ships ten leagues off the coast of 
Spanish dominions either; as a matter of fact: 
I passeggeri di qualsiasi nazione a bordo dei bastimenti spagnoli, così 
come i passeggeri spagnoli a bordo di qualsiasi bastimento nemico di 
Tripoli che si predasse, resteranno liberi con tutti i loro effetti, e mercan-
zie, anche nel caso che il bastimento nemico si fosse difeso. Lo stesso si 
farà con i passaggieri forestieri che li Spagnuoli trovassero né bastimenti 
Tripolini, e con i Tripolini a bordo di bastimenti nemici di Spagna.57
In turn, the Bey Bassà of Tripoli could refuse to give help to armed 
Barbary ships that came into port to wage war against the Spanish, so 
it was established that any [subject] taken prisoner in Tripoli «sarà libe-
ro in esse, come fosse in Ispagna» (will be considered a free man, as if he 
were in Spain). Wherever they came from, pirate ships entering Tripol-
itan ports were seized with all their merchandise and kept there for a 
year, whereas Spanish ships had to be delivered directly to the consul.58 
Warships, corsair ships and merchant vessels of both the contracting 
countries could enter all the ports of their dominions freely, and get 
everything they needed at a good price. Furthermore, the Bey Bassà 
made a commitment to keep the most powerful foreign ships in his ports 
for at least a couple of days to facilitate the departure of Spanish ships 
 57. «Foreign passengers travelling on Spanish vessels, as well as Spanish passen-
gers on any Tripolitan enemy vessel being assaulted, shall be set free with all their 
belongings and merchandise, even if the enemy vessels resisted. The same applies to 
foreign passengers Spanish will find travelling on Tripolitan vessels, and to Tripolitans 
aboard any vessel enemy to the Spanish.» Nuova Collezione delle Prammatiche, V. 
Foedus Regium et Tripolitum, pp. 338-346. 
 58. Ibidem.
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from the port. The captain of a Spanish ship was required to contact the 
Consul before the Bey Bassà, as soon as he reached the port. Guard boats 
usually escorted the ships to the port, where they received from the Rais 
della marina (Captain) an iron chain to prevent the slaves from taking 
possession of the Lancia (launch). All ships had to pay 27 piasters for 
anchorage duty and for entrance and departure duty, whereas no anchor-
age duty was imposed on emergency mooring. Trade was permitted in all 
ports of the Regency of Tripoli, where a single duty rate of 3% was im-
posed, and the same applied to Tripolitan subjects in Spanish domin-
ions. No entrance duties were charged on prohibited goods such as «pol-
veri, palle, cannoni, schioppi, zolfo, legni da costruzione, peci, catrame, 
ecc.» (gunpowder, balls, cannons, shotguns, sulphur, timber, pitch, tar, etc.), 
neither were taxes on breaming and hog (diritto di carena e «di dar sego») 
or departure duties on goods remaining unsold and loaded on board the 
ship again. The last articles of the treaty sanctioned the right of His Maj-
esty the Catholic King to appoint Consuls in Tripoli, who had the pow-
er «di assistere e patrocinare pubblicamente i sudditi di Spagna» (to assist 
Spanish subjects and act as attorney for them publicly).59 
Following Antonio Genovesi’s mercantilist view of economics and 
his scholar Ferdinando Galiani’s contributions, in 1787 the Kingdom 
of Naples and Russia signed a profitable treaty establishing a new trade 
route in the Black Sea. However, this new trade, interrupted by wars at 
the end of the eighteenth century (like the second Russo-Turkish war, 
ending in 1791), increased only after the Restoration, when the port of 
Odessa experienced extraordinary development (1815).60
 59. Ibidem.
 60. Maria Sirago, «Il consolato napoletano nel Mar Nero e lo sviluppo di Odes-
sa tra la fine del ‘700 e la prima metà dell’800», in Mafrici, Mascilli Migliorini, Me-
diterraneo e Mar Nero, pp. 203-233.
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